Abstract

Accounting conservatism can serve as a mechanism to balance the interests of managers and shareholders and to reduce the effects of information asymmetry. Much of the research examining conservatism has been conducted in Anglo-American settings, in which ownership is typically widely dispersed. In Asian countries, such as Iran, ownership structure tends to be more concentrated, and state owners are more prevalent. In this paper, we examine the relationships between ownership structure and conservatism in Iran. Three ownership structure issues are examined: the influence of the largest shareholder, whether the largest shareholder is the government, and the power and governmental status of minority shareholders. The research population takes all the companies listed in Tehran Stock Exchange in the years 1381-1391. We find that conservatism is negatively associated with the percentage of shares held by the largest shareholder, and that this effect is particularly significant when the ownership percentage exceeds 30%. The results indicate that if the state is the largest shareholder of the company, such firms have less Level of conservatism than the other companies. Also, our results indicate that privately controlled companies in which the state owns a minority interest are more conservative than those without material state minority ownership.