Abstract
Existence "non-institution shareholders", created agency conflict between management and ownership. This agency conflict may lead to information asymmetry that this information asymmetry can to put impact different on dividend policy. The main objective of this study is investigation of effect of the non-institution shareholders on dividend policy in companies listed in Tehran Stock Exchange Indeed, this study seek to answer this question whether "non-institutional shareholders" can to play efficiency role in corporates dividend policy, and if so, how this effect can be interpreted? To answer this question used of three the dividend main theories namely agency theory, signaling theory, pecking order theory. Our sample included 144 companies listed in Tehran Stock Exchange during the period is 1389-1380. We used Tobit Model based on cumulative data to test the research hypothesis. Our findings this study indicate that exists significant and negative relationship between ownership Percent "non-institution shareholders" and dividend policy. Indeed, with increasing ownership Percent "non-institution shareholders", decreases corporates dividend.
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